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We owe it to the [UN] Organization, to those who lived through the horrors of the 
genocide, and especially to those who perished in it, to make sure that the tragic sequence 
of events and the inadequate United Nations response to it are scrutinized, analysed and 
reassessed, and every effort made to prevent a possible recurrence.  
Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General, 12 June 1996[1]  
INTRODUCTION  
On 6 April 1994, the most intense genocide since World War II was unleashed upon an 
unprepared world. Starting in Kigali, the Rwanda capital, the systematic slaughter of an 
ethnic group, the Tutsis, spread with a ferocity that even its sinister organizers could not 
have hoped for. In 100 days it consigned about 800,000 Rwandans to their deaths. The 
perpetrators, high within government circles, had made meticulous plans. A radio station 
under their control, Radio Mille Collines,[2] had been whipping up anti-Tutsi hysteria for 
months. Secret arms caches were kept ready for use by government soldiers and the party 
militia, the core cadre of which had been trained in the tactics of slaughter. Lists of Tutsis 
and their Hutu sympathizers had been compiled for targeting. Only a trigger was needed. 
It was provided in a fashion as unexpected as the genocide itself: the killing of the 
Rwandan government leader under whom the genocidaires (genocidists) had worked. As 
the wave of death spread across the country, the international community stood by in a 
stupor, and even sought to avoid its moral and legal responsibilities to mitigate this 
immense human and humanitarian tragedy.  
The key international leaders have admitted that they should have acted. In a news 
conference on 4 May 1998, Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who was under secretary-
general for peacekeeping at the time of the genocide, said: "I agree with [UNAMIR Force 
Commander] General Dallaire when he says, 'If I had had one reinforced brigade - 5,000 
men - well trained and well equipped, I could have saved thousands of lives'."[3] On a 
visit to Africa in March 1998, President Clinton admitted that the world "did not act 
quickly enough" and that "we did not immediately call these crimes by their rightful 
name - genocide."[4] Secretary of State Albright stated that "we - the international 
community - should have been more active in the early stages of the atrocities in 
Rwanda."[5] Many believe that the international community could have acted even 
earlier, to prevent the genocide before it started, or to nip it in the bud in the first few 
days. There are, however, no detailed studies on the precise measures that could have 
been undertaken by the international community and the international organization that 
bears the most responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, the United 
Nations.[6]  
What was necessary for prevention? Three things were needed: an intelligence capability 
(for early warning and planning), preventive measures (i.e., a capability for intervention) 
and the political will to make use of these two. Tragically, it was only the latter that was 
fundamentally lacking, since the first two were present in a nascent state. Though 
inadequate, they could have been further developed given more political will. There was 
a UN peacekeeping force already deployed in the country, with a mandate to contribute 
to Rwandan security. Its commander had received secret intelligence about a genocide 
plot which he deemed convincing enough to begin planning for an active intervention. He 
was, however, restrained by his superiors at UN Headquarters in New York, who felt 
strongly the lack of commitment from the major powers in the Security Council, 
especially the United States. The atmosphere in New York, reflecting that in Washington, 
greatly dimmed the prospects for a greater, more pro-active UN presence in Rwanda that 
could have saved hundreds of thousands of human lives.  
This article will examine each of these three requirements: detailed intelligence, 
preventive measures and political will. It will suggest alternative policies and actions that, 
in hindsight, should have been followed to further develop these capabilities. It is 
essential that the international community not only learn, but also implement, the lessons 
from Rwanda. In the words of US President Clinton: "Let us challenge ourselves to build 
a world in which no branch of humanity . . . is again threatened with destruction . . . to 
strengthen our ability to prevent, and, if necessary, to stop genocide."[7] We hope that 
this article, which proposes, in hindsight, detailed scenarios for possible genocide 
prediction and prevention in Rwanda, will contribute to such an effort.  
BACKGROUND  
Few outsiders could have anticipated that Rwanda, a tiny, mountainous nation located in 
the Rift Valley of south-central Africa, would provide the backdrop for an unprecedented 
African horror. To the casual foreign observer, Rwanda's rustic setting along Lake Kivu, 
its lush hills, its agrarian economy, and its pastoral culture created a semblance of 
simplicity and placidity. Rwanda seemed too remote, too unsophisticated and too docile 
of a nation, to produce nation-wide bloodshed and record numbers of refugees. When the 
UN peace-keeping mission was planned in 1993 the assumption was that this would be an 
easy, relatively trouble-free mission. Romeo Dallaire, the designated Force Commander, 
spoke of the lead up to the mission: "There was absolutely no perception that anything 
except the very positive vibrations that were coming out of Rwanda from both sides . . . 
the peripheral countries, the observers at the Arusha talks, that this was going to be 
classic peace-keeping operation. [The mood was one of] enormous optimism; 
buoyant."[8] This perception of Rwanda and the UN mission, however, was misguided. 
A careful examination of Rwanda's past reveals deep social tensions, a stalled agrarian 
economy, a history of political upheavals, and a frightening pattern of organized, mass 
killings in one of the most densely populated countries of the world.[9]  
Historical Review  
For the first half of the twentieth century, Rwanda was ruled by European powers, first 
by Germany from 1897 to 1916, and then by Belgium until 1962. Given their lack of 
manpower and resources, the Germans allowed the Rwandans virtually to govern 
themselves. Seeking political stability, they accepted the existing institution, a monarchy 
headed by a divine king, or mwami.  
The king's subjects were divided into three principal social groups: the Hutu, Tutsi and 
Twa. The Hutu, mostly poor peasants, comprised the vast majority. The more prosperous 
Tutsi, including the mwami, owned land and cattle, the traditional indicators of wealth in 
Rwandan society. In 1990, they made up about 14 percent of the country's population, 
compared to the Hutu's 85 percent. The remaining one percent were composed of the 
peripheral Twa, groups of nomads and hunters who lived in forested areas. Hutus and 
Tutsis traditionally lived and worked together, their huts juxtaposed in villages 
throughout the Rwandan countryside.  
The differences between these two social groups were not tribal, as they both spoke the 
same language, practiced the same customs, and lived under the same rulers. The primary 
distinctions were economic. Historically, only the minority Tutsi possessed cattle; this 
gave them a higher societal status and, thus, a preferred access to elite government posts. 
Intermarrying between the two groups was common.  
After World War I, Germany lost its colonial foothold in Africa, and Rwanda fell under 
the control of Belgium. The Belgians exploited the disparities between the two principal 
social classes by giving the Tutsi educational and other preferences. They instituted an 
identity card system (which was later to become an important tool in the hands of the 
genocidists) whereby the "ethnic" identity of a person and his or her family became fixed 
and the former movement between the Hutu and Tutsi social classes was prohibited. The 
Belgians believed that the more "superior," more malleable Tutsi aristocrats, now easily 
identified, would be better able to institute European-style reforms. This belief led to 
widespread resentment by Hutus of both the Belgian colonists for creating the favoritism, 
and of their Tutsi neighbors for benefitting from it.  
By the end of the 1950s, popular sentiment toward Belgian colonial rule, among Hutus 
and Tutsis alike, had changed from tacit compliance to fervid opposition. Each group 
sought both the establishment of an independent Rwandan nation and total control of that 
nation's government. Hutu and Tutsi political parties were formed. The cause for 
Rwandan independence was aided by the United Nations, increasing distaste of the 
Belgian rule, which had proven disastrous in the neighboring Congo, where the UN had 
to engage in a large peacekeeping operation beginning in 1960. In 1962, the Republic of 
Rwanda was formed, and elections brought the Hutus under President Gregoire 
Kayibanda to power for the first time in Rwandan history.  
As in the neighboring Congo, Belgium had prepared its colony very poorly for 
independence. The underlying resentment between Hutus and Tutsis heightened. The 
transition to republican government was anything but peaceful and cooperative. During a 
two-month period in fall 1961, vengeful violence by Hutus led to the killings of over 100 
Tutsis, the burning of over 3,000 homes, and the displacement of close to 22,000 persons. 
A report by the UN Trusteeship Commission concluded that "an oppressive system has 
been replaced by another one," and ominously predicted that "it is quite possible that 
some day we will witness violent reactions on the part of the Tutsi."[10] Indeed, the Tutsi 
refugees who had settled in neighboring countries such as Tanzania, Burundi and 
Uganda, began to form small, roving, armed bands - pejoratively labeled inyenzi or 
"cockroaches" by the Hutus - to engage in terrorist acts against the new Hutu regime.  
The first decade of the independent Rwandan state involved repeated attempts by Tutsi 
rebels to overthrow the Hutu government by both subversive activities and overt military 
operations. In response, the Hutus in power inflicted widespread violence upon Tutsi 
citizens. As a result, by the mid-1960s over 20,000 Tutsis had been slaughtered, and more 
than 150,000 had been forced to flee to the nation's periphery.  
In 1973, during a period of economic stagnation and anti-Tutsi sentiment, General 
Juvenal Habyarimana, the Rwandan Minister of Defense, overthrew the shaky regime of 
President Kayibanda. He established an authoritarian, nepotistic government dominated 
by his Hutu political party, the Mouvement Revolutionaire National pour le 
Developpement (MRND). The Habyarimana regime systematically worked to weaken 
and isolate Tutsi citizens. It required all citizens to carry cards that labeled them either 
Hutu or Tutsi. Through discriminatory policies, and sometimes open harassment, it 
weeded out Tutsis from positions in the military, civil service and local governments.  
By 1990, Tutsi rebels in Uganda had organized a united, military organization dedicated 
to re-establishing Tutsi rule in Rwanda: the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Its first 
major attack on the Rwandan government occurred on 1 October 1990, from Uganda. 
The RPF was formed by past refugees and the children of past refugees who had fled 
Rwanda after 1959 when the majority Hutus staged a "social revolution." From 1961 to 
the 1970s the Tutsi refugees had staged a number of armed returns to Rwanda. On 
multiple occasions between 1990 and 1993 the RPF launched military incursions from 
Uganda into Rwanda, plunging the country into civil war. With the encouragement of 
international organizations, such as the Organization for African Unity (OAU) and the 
United Nations, the RPF and the Habyarimana regime officially concluded a ceasefire in 
1991, though this was broken on many occasions. In August 1993, at Arusha, Tanzania, 
they finally reached an agreement on a power-sharing arrangement that would return 
multi-party rule to Rwanda. To assist in the implementation of this agreement, the United 
Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) arrived in the capital of Kigali in 
October of 1993, under the command of Major General Romeo Dallaire from Canada. 
The UN peacekeeping operation was under the political control of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Jacques-Rogers Booh-Booh from 
Cameroon, who also had a good offices mandate to mediate between parties and facilitate 
the peace process.  
During the first few months of UNAMIR's mission, however, the peace agreement 
between the Hutu and Tutsi representative institutions was far from being implemented. 
Then on 6 April, two surface-to-air missiles brought down the plane carrying the 
presidents of Rwanda and Burundi as it approached the runway at Kigali airport. Almost 
immediately, the systematic, well-planned and merciless killings of Tutsis and Hutu 
moderates in Kigali began. In addition, ten Belgian paratroopers, part of the Belgian 
contingent of the UN force, were disarmed and murdered by Rwandan government troops 
as they sought to protect the Rwandan prime minister, who was assassinated. In the 
subsequent three months, the genocide swept across the country, as hundreds of 
thousands of Tutsis and political dissidents were slaughtered by the Hutu-dominated 
militias, the Interahamwe, as well as the gendarmerie and, not least, the Presidential 
Guard. The Presidential Guard was the best organized, most lethal force in the country. It 
was used for assassinations of senior political figures, for systematic herding of 
populations, and to clear out pockets of resistance for the weaker but much larger 
Interahamwe. News of the atrocities in Rwanda sent shock waves throughout the 
international community and the peacekeeping office at the United Nations.  
Evidence suggests that a strengthened intelligence capability among the United Nations 
could have unveiled the detailed plans for this genocide. Furthermore, had the UN 
engaged in preventive diplomacy or, later, preventive deployment of troops, it may very 
well have been able to prevent many senseless killings that followed. Intelligence-
gathering in several areas in particular could have provided clear and sufficient clues 
about the genocide months in advance: illicit arms flows, insider information on the 
genocide plots, the training and activities of the Interahamwe, the activities and 
reputations of the plotters themselves, and a long-standing pattern of ethnically-based 
human rights violations. Unfortunately, the UN did not analyze or synthesize these 
important pieces of evidence, nor did it pro-actively seek further information that could 
have corroborated and deepened the information at hand.  
The UN also ignored a range of possible preventive measures. Before examining in detail 
these early warning signals and preventive actions, it is important to see if the UN 
actually had the mandate, if not the means or the initiative, to gather intelligence and to 
act upon it for prevention.  
UN Mandate for Monitoring and Prevention  
The UN peacekeeping force was first envisioned in the Arusha Accords, which were 
signed in Arusha on 4 August 1993 after almost three years of civil war between the 
government of the Rwandese Republic and the rebel forces of the RPF. The Accords 
were designed to bring an end to hostilities and to pave the way for a transition to 
democracy, with the UN force to play a major stabilizing role.[11] The Arusha Accords 
envisioned a series of democratic reforms, including steps toward a broad-based 
transitional government (BBTG), national elections, the integration of the armed forces 
of the two main combatants, and the repatriation of refugees who had fled to neighboring 
countries during the civil war.  
In the Arusha Accords both parties pledged to promote the security of Rwanda. They 
promised to uphold the Ceasefire Agreement of 16 September 1991, which included the 
"suspension of supplies of ammunition and weaponry to the field," as well as a "ban on 
infiltration of troops and on the conveyance of troops and war material to the area 
occupied by each party."[12] These prohibitions imply that any type of movement of 
arms, including shipments from abroad, would violate the Ceasefire Agreement, and thus 
the Accords. Thus, by August 1993, the two official parties to the Rwandan civil war had 
agreed in writing to prevent the influx of arms to Rwanda.  
The UN force, according to the Accords, was to "assist in the tracking of arms caches and 
neutralization of armed gangs throughout the country." Moreover, the mission was to 
have an even larger mandate to "assist in the recovery of all weapons distributed to, or 
illegally acquired by the civilians."[13] While the actual mandate of the force would be 
determined later by the UN Security Council, these proposed security missions show, 
among other things, that the negotiators of the Arusha Accords sought a proactive, 
investigative force designed to prevent the flow of arms to any sources of instability.  
The mandate provided by the Security Council for the peacekeeping force was less 
ambitious, but it still committed the UN to lessening the militant conditions in Rwanda. 
Resolution 872 of 5 October 1993, which formally established the peacekeeping force, 
gave UNAMIR a primary function to "contribute to the security of Kigali," including by 
monitoring a "weapons-secure area established by the parties in and around the city." 
UNAMIR troops were also instructed to "monitor observance of the cease-fire 
agreement" embodied in the Arusha Accords, as well as "other demilitarization 
procedures." This force was to investigate "instances of alleged non-compliance" with the 
provisions of the Arusha Accords related to the integration of the armed forces. These 
"instances" could be either observable transgressions or hints of them. UNAMIR was 
also mandated to "investigate and report on incidents regarding the activities of the 
gendarmerie and police," ostensibly to ensure that these groups provided security and to 
contribute to an abating of tensions between the Rwandan government and the rebel 
forces of the RPF.[14] The United Nations had also planned to use UNAMIR as a 
complement to the already existing peacekeeping operation, UNOMUR,[15] which had 
been mandated to gather information about potential transgressions, chiefly the illicit 
flow of firearms through the border with Uganda, that might disrupt the peace process. 
This resolution demonstrates that in the months prior to the genocide, during which the 
secret preparations were taking place, the United Nations had possessed the mandate to 
investigate non-compliance with the Accords and to promote the security of Rwanda.  
Even more broadly, under Article 1 of its Charter, the UN has a responsibility "to 
maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective 
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression 
of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace."[16] According to Article 99 of the 
Charter, the Secretary-General possesses the power to bring potential threats to the peace 
directly before the Security Council.[17] In this way the Secretary-General can use his 
discretion to shine a spotlight on any matter that he feels may endanger the mission of the 
UN.  
Furthermore, in the matter of the serious international crime of genocide, the international 
community has a legal as well as moral obligation to intervene. Article I of the 1948 
"Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide" requires that 
the 128 states parties (including all five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council) 
consider genocide a crime "which they undertake to prevent and punish."[18] This 
includes "conspiracy to commit genocide," "attempt to commit genocide," and "direct 
and public incitement to commit genocide" (Article III). Thus, planning for, or spreading 
propaganda for genocide are criminal acts, as the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda later was to uphold.[19] Article VIII of the Genocide Convention allows parties 
to summon the UN to take action for the "prevention and suppression of acts of 
genocide." In other words, any state party could present a charge of genocide before the 
UN, and call upon the organization to take action. In addition, parties to the Genocide 
Convention are obliged to "enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the 
necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention."[20] 
Thus, parties to the Convention must make their obligation "to prevent and to punish" 
genocide part of their national law. In summary, a firmly established treaty gave both the 
UN and individual countries a responsibility to prevent the destruction of one ethnic or 
religious group, in whole or in part, by another.  
Thus the UN had a mandate for proactive investigations and some authority and means 
for intervention. We can now examine the indicators and evidence that could, at least in 
hindsight, have been used to predict the genocide and the means that might have been 
used to prevent it.  
EARLY WARNING SIGNALS  
Illicit Arms  
The country is flooded with weapons. Two beers will get you one grenade.  
- A Western Diplomat in Kigali[21]  
The UN peacekeeping force had a strong mandate to monitor illegal arms, but there was a 
major deficiency in its investigative capability. We begin by focusing on the key weapons 
that triggered the genocide: the Soviet-made missiles that brought down the Rwandan 
president's plane.  
The French newspaper, Le Figaro, has alleged that the serial numbers of the two surface-
to-air missiles which struck the plane match those of missiles seized from Iraq by French 
troops during the Gulf War of 1991. The reporter, Patrick de Saint-Exupery, cited 
testimony from two anonymous officers of the French military, who claimed that the 
SAM-16 missiles, after being confiscated from Iraqi stockpiles, were sold to Rwandan 
government forces between November 1993 and February 1994 as part of a covert 
French policy labeled "le secret defense."[22] These missiles, smuggled into Rwanda 
from abroad, were just a small part of a massive weapons influx that violated the 
Ceasefire Agreement and created tremendous insecurity. Bernard Debre, the French 
Minister of Development at the time of the crash, repudiated the substance of the Le 
Figaro story and, in turn, accused the American State Department of supplying the 
missiles. Debre claimed that the two missiles were seized by American, not French, 
forces in the Gulf, and soon after sold to the neighboring country of Uganda.[23] Yet he 
produced no concrete proof that would shift responsibility for the missiles away from the 
French government. And further evidence shows that the missile affair fits a broader 
pattern of acts of French favoritism to the Rwandan government.  
France was a principal source of arms for the Rwanda government under a policy of 
staunch support for the Hutu regime of Juvenal Habyarimana, the Rwandan president. 
According to the Human Rights Watch Arms Project, while regularly proclaiming to the 
international community its neutrality in the Rwandan conflict, France supplied machine 
guns, artillery, armored vehicles, and six Gazelle helicopters to the Forces Armees 
Rwandaises (FAR), the Rwandan army, after the outbreak of fighting in 1990.[24] In 
fact, French military officials often encountered difficulty obtaining approval of the 
Interministerial Committee for War Material Exports for arms transfers to Rwanda 
because the volume of equipment was so great.[25] Even high-ranking Rwandan 
government officials admitted to having received abundant French support. For example, 
the Rwandan Minister of Defense in June 1993, James Gasana, confirmed that a French 
bank, Credit Lyonnais, had guaranteed a $6 million arms deal between the Rwandan 
government and the government of Egypt involving the transfer of heavy artillery, 
mortars and Kalashnikov (AK-47) automatic rifles. In order to help finance the deal, the 
Rwandan government was forced to put up much of its tea harvest for collateral.[26] The 
magnitude of the deal suggests both that elements of the Habyarimana's regime had no 
interest in abiding by the Ceasefire Agreement, and that the French government had made 
a clear policy preference of unconditional military support to one party during a time 
when disarmament and impartiality were crucial to ensuring peace.  
In the period leading up to Arusha, the Habyarimana regime played a direct role in the 
arming of civilians, justified as defence against an invasion from outsiders (Ugandan-
based Tutsis). Its goal, according to a secret government document obtained by the 
Human Rights Watch Arms Project, was to distribute nearly 2,000 assault rifles to 
civilians loyal to the MRND, the president's political party, under the guise of a "self-
defense" force. While this civilian force had not yet engaged in human rights abuses to 
the extent of the Interahamwe, the report cautioned that "it is frightening to ponder the 
potential for abuses by large numbers of ill-trained civilians equipped with assault 
rifles."[27] There was no slowdown in the import of military hardware to Rwanda; rather, 
high-ranking Rwandan officials were arming their citizens and militia, and trading tea for 
weapons. After Arusha, no weapons were supposed to come into the country, but that 
also was systematically flouted.  
Arms had become plentiful in Rwanda; grenades were sold alongside mangos and 
avocados on fruit stands at markets around Kigali.[28] UNAMIR officials were aware of, 
but could not cope with or monitor, the extent of illicit arms transfers. They were 
unsuccessful, moreover, in obtaining the necessary UN approval to conduct searches, 
raids or to confiscate weapons from civilians and militia members. UNAMIR 
communications in the months before 6 April show that UNAMIR officers were aware 
that prodigious amounts of arms and ammunition were flowing into Rwanda and were 
concerned about the danger it presented, but they were denied permission by UN 
headquarters in New York to take offensive action to confiscate weapons.  
Ominous signs appeared of a motive for the stockpiling and distribution of these 
instruments of death. A Belgian UNAMIR lieutenant sensed they were to be used for an 
impending catastrophe, as he was later to recall:  
We also realized something big was being prepared, but we didn't know exactly what. 
But we learned quickly through informants that arms were hidden in the area and 
distributed in anticipation of the massacres.[29]  
The UNAMIR mandate to help establish and monitor a "weapons secure area" around 
Kigali was being challenged. Under the mandate, it was agreed that weapons, except 
personal arms, could be transported only under escort by UN military observers. But 
machine guns and some heavy weaponry were readily seen. At the end of January 1994, 
SRSG Booh-Booh griped to the press that "weapons are distributed from arms caches 
around Kigali and even inside town."[30]  
An informer named "Jean Pierre" declared to the UNAMIR Commander that there were 
four major arms caches. He even took an African UN peacekeeper to one of them at the 
headquarters of the MRND. There, in the building, he showed the astonished Senegalese 
soldier a large stockpile of weapons, mostly AK-47s, ammunition and grenades. (The 
Senegalese peacekeeper, who posed as a friendly African officer, obviously was not 
wearing a UN uniform, to permit passage through the sentry post at the entrance of the 
building.)  
UNAMIR officials directly observed French involvement in weapons transfers. Under the 
direction of Belgian Colonel Luc Marchal, sector commander for Kigali, UNAMIR 
troops even confiscated a shipment of arms from France at the Kigali airport on 22 
January. A UN military observer stationed at the Kigali airport noticed that an 
unscheduled flight was arriving. The pilot could present no manifest so Belgian 
peacekeepers surrounded the plane, and found a cargo of illegal arms and munitions, 
which was confiscated. Documents found in the plane gave evidence of many evasive 
maneuvers taken by the French and Belgian suppliers, including false end-users and 
circuitous routes. They also observed another shipment on 9 April, three days after the 
commencement of the genocide. In short, violations of the Arusha Ceasefire Agreement 
were plentiful, highly visible and fostered by non-Rwandan players.  
To high-ranking UNAMIR officers, direct observation of the proliferation of these arms 
demanded rapid, preemptive action. Force Commander Romeo Dallaire had, in the first 
few days of January 1994, "implemented the first offensive ops [operations] planning 
against armed political militias and suspicious area." The peacekeeping force was to be 
"focused on ensuring the Kigali weapons secure area and gathering of information 
regarding armed political militias and suspicious area in order to prevent escalation of 
tensions."[31]  
UNAMIR officials believed that information-gathering on weapons distribution was vital 
to their mission and planned to take offensive action. All that was needed was the 
physical/logistical capability and the approval from New York to carry out such 
operations. Since UNAMIR was considered a defensive mission, it lacked sufficient 
equipment, particularly armored personnel carriers, to undertake "search and seize" type 
operations. Even so Dallaire asked for permission to begin raids on the known arms 
caches. As well, UNAMIR commanders called on their superiors at UN headquarters to 
grant and arrange for future shipments of the necessary equipment. But neither additional 
equipment nor the authorization to conduct searches and seizures with the capability at 
hand were granted.  
Conscientious Informers  
Late in the day of January 10 I had a visit from someone who asked to be called "Jean-
Pierre.' He was a leader of the MRND militia, the famous Interahamwe . . . He explained 
he was struggling with his conscience. He was in the process of systematically arming all 
cells of the capital. He'd received orders several days earlier to identify every Tutsi in 
each cell, and when word came, to assassinate all of them point blank. From what he told 
me, they were capable of killing about 1,000 Tutsi every twenty minutes, so this was an 
extensive organization, and that was our undoing.  
- Colonel Luc Marchal,  
Commander of Kigali sector for UNAMIR[32]  
The most startling and explicit early warning came from human sources. High-ranking 
UN officials in Kigali and New York were informed in clear language and with 
convincing evidence of a sinister plot to sabotage the peace process and carry out 
genocide.  
The key personality was a former security aide to President Habyarimana who was 
responsible for training the Interahamwe. Referring to himself as "Jean-Pierre," the 
informer had several meetings with Dallaire and Marchal in which he disclosed a 
macabre plot to which, he claimed, he could not, in clear conscience, be a party. Jean-
Pierre asserted that, since the arrival of the UNAMIR force, the goals of the Interahamwe 
had changed. While originally the militia served as a national force aimed at helping 
protect the country from RPF attacks, it was evolving into a partisan strong-arm designed 
to wreak violence against the country's Tutsis. As a leader within the Interahamwe, Jean-
Pierre had been ordered to compile lists of Tutsis in Kigali which he thought were to be 
used "for their extermination." The informant said that while he supported the actions 
against the RPF, he could not "support the killing of innocent persons."  
The organizers of the plan, whom Jean-Pierre said included leaders of the extreme 
factions of Habyarimana's political party, the MRND, sought to block the establishment 
of the new government, and to force UNAMIR to withdraw from Rwanda by engineering 
more violence. For example, Jean-Pierre had himself played a role in efforts to prevent 
the installation of the new members of the BBTG. In one operation planned for early 
January, the Rwandan opposition "deputies were to be assassinated upon entry or exit 
from Parliament," and RPF forces were to be confronted in order to "provoke a civil 
war." As it turns out, demonstrations by an organized mob in front of parliament were 
sufficient to stop the swearing in ceremonies. The plot was not hatched on schedule, but 
the preparations continued.  
The informant asserted that if, during the swearing-in ceremony, the "Belgian soldiers 
resorted to force [to prevent the assassinations] a number of them were to be killed and 
thus guarantee Belgian withdrawal from Rwanda."[33] In addition, Jean-Pierre pointed 
out exact locations of Interahamwe weapons caches in and around Kigali that were to be 
used in the subsequent slaughter of Tutsis. According to Marchal, "a UN officer 
accompanied him to MRND headquarters. In the building there was indeed a stockpile of 
arms and ammunition," providing further irrefutable evidence to UN officials that arms 
were being improperly stored for distribution by the government.  
It quickly became clear to Dallaire and Marchal that immediate action needed to be 
taken, as Jean-Pierre's assertions backed up their own observations. Faxes were sent to 
New York around the time of their meetings with Jean-Pierre giving clear evidence of the 
informant's credibility. As mentioned, Jean-Pierre had explained that deputies of the 
BBTG had been targeted on their way to and from the parliament. Confirming this, the 
outgoing code cable from SRSG Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh of 11 January 1994 mentions 
the establishment of road blocks by the Presidential Guard and the Interahamwe around 
Kigali, and that "their aim was to prevent the deputies from getting to the parliament and 
to prevent essential meetings at Prime Minister level and senior political levels in order to 
solve the impasse between the parties." In the process, "civilian drivers were beaten." The 
cable also mentions that hundreds of armed protestors loyal to the MRND "blocked the 
entrance to the parliament and harassed deputies," a description of events which 
corroborates the informant's story. In addition, UN officials had verified the existence of 
the weapons caches first-hand.  
Also on 11 January, Dallaire sent an urgent fax to New York, addressed to Major General 
Maurice Baril, the UN Secretary-General's military advisor, describing the informant's 
revelations that there was a plan to "exterminate" the Tutsis, brutally sabotage the peace 
process, remove the Belgian peacekeeping contingent and provoke a civil war through 
forceful confrontation (see Appendix). Within the "genocide" fax, as it has come to be 
called, Dallaire outlined his plan to raid arms caches promptly to prevent the contents 
from being used in the plots. "It is our intention to take action within the next 36 hours," 
Dallaire wrote. "Recce [reconnaissance] of armed cache and detailed planning of raid to 
go on late tomorrow."  
Dallaire noted that Jean-Pierre would be willing to offer further information, specifically 
the locations of more weapons and ammunition, in exchange for a UN pledge to provide 
protection and asylum. "He was ready to go to the arms cache tonight," Dallaire stated in 
the fax, "if we gave him the following guarantee. He requests that he and his family be 
placed under our protection." Dallaire went on to urge his superiors in New York to grant 
Jean-Pierre's request, but indicated that he had little background on UN policy in this 
area. "It is recommended the informant be granted protection and evacuated out of 
Rwanda," wrote the Force Commander. "This HQ does not have previous UN experience 
in such matters and urgently requests guidance."  
No doubt the plots represented a major threat to the goals of the UN mission as well as to 
the lives of the peacekeepers themselves. The presence of secret weapons caches 
undermined the security of Kigali and were a violation of the Ceasefire Agreement 
upheld in the Arusha Accords. Moreover, plots to provoke civil war would mean the 
failure of all efforts to bring peace to the war-torn country. They should have sounded 
alarm bells in the mind of peacekeeping officials in New York. But action was not 
forthcoming; guarantees for the informer were not given. Over the next few months, the 
ominous revelations were forgotten in the hustle and bustle of regular diplomatic and 
peacekeeping activity. Besides, other issues were pressing on the UN and troubling its 
leadership.[34]  
The informant's revelations called for a bold UNAMIR response beginning in January. 
As was mentioned earlier, Dallaire was ready to take preemptive measures, which he 
described in detail in his fax, but he was denied permission from his superiors in New 
York to raid the weapons caches. He was told instead to divulge the plan to the 
government head, President Habyarimana, whose inner circle included members of the 
Akazu (or "little house") who were developing the genocide plot. "New York advised 
Dallaire, "You should assume that he' - Habyarimana (President of Rwanda) - "is not 
aware of these activities, but insist that he must immediately look into the situation'."[35] 
By denying permission to provide guarantees for Jean-Pierre, by failing to act to gain 
more information on a continuing basis and by vetoing proactive preventive actions, New 
York blundered. Perhaps in the hope that others could take initiatives where the UN did 
not, Dallaire was also told to inform the ambassadors of the United States, Belgium and 
France, which he dutifully did. Jean-Pierre broke off contact, not being willing to risk his 
life and the lives of his family members.  
Nefarious Plotters  
I am planning for the apocalypse.  
- Theoneste Bagosora, January 1993  
Plans for the genocide had been "in the works" for some time. In early 1993, when a 
friend asked Col. Theoneste Bagosora, a key plotter, what kind of work he was doing, he 
replied with the above cryptic quote. But this sinister and detailed planning needed to be 
done carefully, incrementally and, above all, secretly.  
Still, rumors about it were in circulation. For instance, in October 1992, Belgian 
Professor Filip Reyntjens had described the notorious group as composed of Coalition 
pour la Defense de la Republique (CDR) and Akazu leaders, and extremist military and 
Interahamwe units dedicated to promoting their ideal of "Hutu power." The possible 
existence of "Network Zero," a group of extremists who planned Tutsi massacres, was 
noted in the report of a UN Special Rapporteur in 1993. The "Zero Network" was likened 
to a Latin American death squad, able to roam the country slaughtering Tutsis with no 
censure from the government. Indeed, it must have had the tacit approval of President 
Habyarimana, who was negotiating, under considerable international pressure, to obtain 
the most favorable terms against the Tutsi rebels.[36]  
The names of the organizations and many persons responsible for the genocide are now 
well established. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has indicted 
many of the leaders. NGO groups, such as Africa Watch, have provided detailed accounts 
based on interviews conducted after the genocide with a wide range of Rwandans. It is 
more important, however, to discover if the sinister organizations and individuals were 
identified prior to the genocide. The Human Rights Watch Arms Project did produce a 
report in January 1994 that described an inner circle of nefarious figures around the 
president, but it couldn't confirm the existence of the group.  
[A] persuasive number of non-French Western diplomats, Rwandan military officers, and 
civilians with a long standing personal relationship with Rwandan President 
Habyarimana told the Arms Project that they suspect members of the regime, and in 
particular the first circle or so-called "little house' around the President . . . to be 
responsible for these terrorist attacks. These people told the Arms Project that powerful 
elements in the Akazu, who have largely ruled Rwanda since 1973, opposed both the 
negotiations to end the war and the opening to opposition political parties. Nonetheless, 
there is no proof at this time.[37]  
An inner circle of political figures close to President Habyarimana, the Akazu, served as 
the backbone for planning the massacres. The leaders of this group consisted of the 
president's wife and extremist military officials, including Habyarimana's brother-in-law, 
Col. Eli Sagatwa, and Col. Leon Mugesera. This clique opposed any compromise with 
the RPF and the opposition parties, both of which were to be included in the envisioned 
BBTG under the Arusha Accords. The Akazu also served as a propaganda engine for 
extremist elements of the MRND and the CDR, a radical party seeking a "final solution" 
to the ethnic conflict between Tutsis and Hutus, and later one of the main organizers of 
the genocide.  
Dallaire later called Col. Theoneste Bagosora the "king-pin" in the genocide plot. But 
Dallaire did not know this when the crisis erupted, to the great detriment of his mission. 
Within hours after the plane crash and the death of the president, he sought and received 
Bagosora's assurance that the Rwandan army troops would stay calm. Little did Dallaire 
know that Bagosora's troops had been sent to assassinate the Prime Minister, Agathe 
Uwilingiyimana, kill the Belgian troops protecting her, and murder the leaders of 
opposition parties, the president of the Supreme Court, and many human rights activists.  
Vile Propaganda  
The only remedy is total extermination, to kill them all, totally wipe them out.  
- Hutu extremist radio Radio-Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) broadcast 
before the genocide[38]  
Throughout the Arusha period, extremist elements within the Rwandan government, 
including the plotters of the genocide, attempted to whip up public anger, hate and 
vengeance against the Tutsis. Inflammatory speeches and chants were broadcast 
throughout the country by RTLM created precisely for that purpose. The peacekeeping 
force monitored several of these radio broadcasts.[39] But it was hard to take them as 
serious, authoritative or credible, because they were so extreme. They fully demonized 
the Tutsis in an incredible and unrealistic fashion, for instance by likening them to 
cockroaches (inyenzi) that needed to be exterminated.[40] Belgians were also targets of 
propaganda. Unfortunately, UNAMIR and the UN did not analyze these broadcasts to 
determine what the specific threats and consequences could be, e.g., who might be the 
next targets for assassination or massacre.  
The seriousness of this hate propaganda became all too evident to UNAMIR in the early 
stages of the genocide, when the radio station advocated the death of Belgian 
peacekeepers, who were accused as perpetrators of the assassination of the president:  
These Belgian bandits have committed many atrocities that merit punishment. We 
Rwandans will never forget that these bandits killed the President we loved. The red-
skinned Belgians have behaved like beasts. They should pay for their acts.[41]  
It is relevant to recall that the sinister plan to kill Belgian peacekeepers had been revealed 
some three months earlier by the informer Jean-Pierre. He had accurately foretold that 
Belgian paratroops would be targeted and killed to "ensure their withdrawal." The 
Belgian government unilaterally withdrew its contingent from UNAMIR in less than ten 
days after the killings.  
As the genocide developed, the extremists used the airwaves to justify their actions and to 
assign blame on the Tutsis for the nation's shortcomings. Outrageously cruel and 
inhuman broadcasts filled the airwaves. Macabre lines were set to popular tunes. These 
chilling words, set to a charming melody, were sung on the air:  
Where are those Tutsi who used to phone me? Ah, they must have all been exterminated. 
Let us sing: The Tutsi have been killed. God is always just! The criminals will be 
exterminated![42]  
Public rallies were another means of spreading propaganda, inciting violence and 
preparing the Hutu majority to condone, if not commit, the atrocities that were to occur. 
Venomous speeches by members of Network Zero immediately preceded several 
massacres of Tutsi civilians. For example, in November 1992, the MRND-leader Dr. 
Leon Mugesera viciously urged a crowd to take up arms against their Tutsi neighbors. 
"Their home is Ethiopia," Mugesera declared. "Let's find them a shortcut to get back 
there. That's the Nyabarongo River." The very next day, small-scale massacres of Tutsis 
were reported in the Kibya region of Rwanda, and bodies were dumped in the river.[43]  
On 7 April 1994, the Prime Minister of the Interim Government, Jean Kambanda, rallied 
Hutus while holding a gun aloft: "The enemy uses his gun, you must fire back! Go behind 
the front line, find their accomplices. Shoot to kill! Everyone must have his own gun, 
don't be afraid to use it."[44] Fortunately, this speech was videotaped and later used 
against Kambanda in his trial before the International Tribunal. He was sentenced to life 
in prison on 4 September 1998 after having pleaded guilty to genocide charges.[45]  
Macabre Militia  
All parties in Rwanda and all over the world have young people as members. That is 
what we have. But we do not have militias.  
- Matthieu Ngirumpatse, chairman of the MRND, 27 April 1994[46]  
We know that they [MRND] gave them weapons and trained them militarily up to one 
thousand and seven hundred . . . We have the army, we have the police force to protect 
the country, what are the others for?  
- Parti Social Democrate (PSD) spokesman Felicien Gatabazi[47]  
The Interahamwe are well trained military killers.  
- article in the Rwandan press, 17 March 1992[48] 
The origins of the militia in Rwanda date back to the period following the signing of the 
initial ceasefire agreement between the FAR and the RPF at N'Sele on 29 March 1991. 
Given the invasions by RPF forces, the Habyarimana regime wanted to use civilians to 
boost the defense of Rwanda.[49] It sought to strengthen defense forces without violating 
the spirit of demobilization and disarmament embodied in the ceasefire agreement. By 
arming civilians, the regime believed it could accomplish these goals. This defensive 
concept of the militia in Rwanda was confirmed by the informant, Jean-Pierre, who told 
Dallaire (as reported in the fax of 11 January 1994) that the main objective of the militia 
"in the past was to protect Kigali from the RPF." One meaning of the word Interahamwe 
is "those who have the same goal" (or "those who fight together"), and the Interahamwe, 
on the surface, appeared to be a patriotic organization dedicated to helping repel RPF 
advances. Yet the motives of its suppliers and its leaders, and the way in which the 
Interahamwe was trained, demonstrate that, at its roots, the organization was more of an 
engine for killing civilians that would eventually carry out most of the genocide.  
Several frightening characteristics of the Interahamwe should have sounded alarm bells 
in the minds of UNAMIR officials in Kigali and New York. For example, extremist 
individuals played a role not only in supplying the Interahamwe with arms, but also 
training its members in combat tactics. Extremist government officials within the CDR 
and the ruling party, the MRND, were also instrumental in providing support to the 
Interahamwe. During the Arusha period, these groups exploited foreign resources to 
indoctrinate militia members. For example, the Rwandan College was a sectarian 
institution for Rwandan youths established and assisted by the government of Canada 
since the 1960s. Soon after the emergence of the Interahamwe the head of the college, 
Father Fran ois Cardinal, complained that Canadian funds were being diverted from the 
school and used by high-ranking government officials, probably to equip the militia. 
Father Cardinal accused Colonel Leon Mugesera, a member of the Akazu, of being 
responsible for this act of corruption. Henceforth Canada withdrew aid for the College.[5] 
Father Cardinal was expelled, soon after registering his complaint, from the Rwandan 
College by Rwandan leader Eli Sagatwa, a member of the Akazu. He was later 
assassinated.  
As arms poured into Rwanda and tensions escalated during the post civil-war period, it 
became clear to members of the local media that the Interahamwe was not merely a 
"youth movement," as Habyarimana had once labeled it. In March 1992, an article in the 
Rwanda press portrayed the Interahamwe as "military killers." Leaders of the 
Interahamwe trained their subordinates not to defend territory, but rather "in commando 
tactics such as the use of knives, machetes, rope trapping and binding of victims and 
silent guns so as to kill people." The article pointed out that the militia had become more 
ideological and apocalyptic in its doctrine. Members were trained to believe not only that 
the RPF was the enemy, but that rival political parties "will jointly kill members of the 
MRND."[51] Moderate government officials were aware that the training of the 
Interahamwe could lead to more killing. The Minister of Finance at the time, Marc 
Rugenera, stated after the genocide that "the military training given to the militias of 
MRND and CDR is part of the evidence that the killings were planned and prepared long 
in advance."[52]  
Some elements of the Rwandan media held that the newly trained and equipped militia 
were responsible for civilian massacres, and even predicted, months before the 
commencement of the genocide, that massive killings would take place. On 17 December 
1993, the journal Le Flam beau mentioned that plotters within the MRND and CDR were 
seeking a "final solution" comparable to that of Hitler. It stated that "political adversaries 
and defenseless populations" would be targeted and slaughtered. The journal also 
announced that "about 8,000 Interahamwe sufficiently trained and equipped by the 
French army await the signal to begin the assassinations among the residents of the city 
of Kigali and its surroundings."[53] Such an ominous prediction, however, passed 
without a response from UNAMIR.  
UNAMIR possessed neither sufficient mandate nor personnel to monitor the training of 
the Rwandan militia. UNAMIR officials came to understand from informants and arms 
monitoring - not through direct observation or oversight of the training of its members - 
that the militia posed a danger to the peace process. For example, Dallaire's fax of 11 
January 1994 states that the informant did mention the existence of 1,700 Interahamwe 
members trained in "discipline, weapons, explosives, close combat and tactics." Yet even 
the fax failed to take into account the extremist, apocalyptic rhetoric and tactics of 
slaughter included in their training program. Similarly, while patrolling UNAMIR units 
did observe movements of arms in the country by the Interahamwe, they did not directly 
observe the training or uncover the doctrine taught at the militia camps.  
UNAMIR possessed a mandate to "investigate and report on incidents regarding the 
activities of the gendarmerie and police."[54] The gendarmerie included "communal 
policemen" of the countryside who, according to African Rights, "were among the very 
worst killers." While the gendarmerie is a separate organization from the Interahamwe, 
African Rights reported that "the Interahamwe would not have had the force they did if it 
were not for the weapons and physical support they obtained from the communal 
policemen."[55] To carry out its mandate to monitor the gendarmerie and police, 
UNAMIR established a civilian police contingent (CIVPOL) of 60 personnel in 
December 1993. This unit sought to monitor, among other areas, the training school for 
the gendarmerie. While CIVPOL reported 54 instances of "serious crimes, complaints 
and allegations of human rights violations" as of the end of March 1994, it made no claim 
that the gendarmerie and police were in any way complicit in planning the massacres of 
Tutsis or moderate Hutus. Later, the two organizations were to become an integral part of 
the killing machine. Nevertheless, the progress report of CIVPOL of 30 March 1994, did 
determine that the "security situation in Rwanda and, especially in Kigali, has seriously 
deteriorated" and pointed to "the availability of weapons" and "ethnic and politically 
motivated crimes" as principal causes.[56]  
While the training methods of the Interahamwe alone could have served as a warning 
signal to peacekeepers, the history of atrocities committed by the militant organization 
provided even more concrete evidence of wrong-doing and a portent of things to come. 
Parts of this militia collaborated with extremist elements of the Presidential Guard in 
Network Zero, which sponsored death squads and compiled lists of Tutsis and moderate 
Hutus to be killed. In mid-March 1992, between 60 and 300 Tutsis were killed and over 
10,000 were displaced in Bugesera. Similarly, 300 Tutsis were butchered in Gisenyi 
during one week in January 1993, almost immediately after the early agreement on 
power-sharing had been announced.[57]  
Immediately prior to and during the Arusha period, the number of massacres appears to 
have decreased, perhaps due to international pressure and the UN presence. The killings 
became more selective. The targets for assassination were mostly moderate government 
officials and human rights leaders, many of whom were Hutu. The Network Zero, using 
Interahamwe forces, orchestrated grenade attacks against leaders of parties in opposition 
to the MRND, parties who would have obtained greater power under the envisioned 
BBTG.[58] Network Zero was responsible for the killing of Samuel Gapyisi, leader of 
the Mouvement Democratique Republicain (MDR), the most prominent rival of the 
MRND, in May 1993. Felicien Gatabazi, head of the Parti Social Democrate, the second-
largest opposition party, was murdered in February 1994, apparently because he was a 
moderate who appealed to Hutus.  
Horrendous Human Rights Violations  
History paints a large, dark backdrop to the sinister genocide. Rwanda had suffered 
widespread killings and long-standing human rights abuses for several years. It was not, 
however, always easy to tell who did the killings, whether FAR, the RPF, the 
Interahamwe, local gangs or even individuals. What was needed was an analysis of the 
killings to reveal patterns and causal links. The UN force did not do this kind of analysis, 
nor did UN headquarters. Most of our information on human rights violations, both then 
and now, comes from human rights organizations.  
NGOs in Rwanda had documented a history of human rights abuses that indicated clearly 
the propensity for violence, if not genocide. These violations, which are summarized in 
Table 1, had been occurring since independence, but escalated immediately after the RFP 
attack on Rwanda in 1990. From October 1990 to April 1991, the government arrested 
over 10,000 people, of whom three-quarters were Tutsi. Most were released without 
charge by April 1991. In the northwest prefecture of Gisenyi local officials incited Hutu 
attacks on Tutsi civilians. The mobs killed over 300 Tutsis, burned over 500 houses and 
caused thousands to flee their homes. This pattern of sporadic massacres of the Tutsi 
population, seemingly in response to RPF attacks, ceasefire agreements and international 
interference, included the massacre of the Babogwe people in January and February 
1991, Tutsi massacres in the Kibuye area in August 1992 and the Bugesera massacres of 
Tutsi in March 1992. During the visit of the International Commission of Inquiry in 
January 1993, burgomasters (mayors) in the northwest warned that violence would flare 
up when the commission left. RGF Captain Pascal Simbikangwa, in full view of the 
Commission, threatened the executive director of the Rwandan Association for the 
Defence of Human Rights and Public Liberties with death. After the Commission's 
departure MRND and CDR militias led attacks on Tutsi across the country, leading to the 
death of over 300 civilians. International human rights reports continuously stressed the 
involvement of government officials and, by 1992, the role taken by the MRND and CDR 
militias in leading the attacks. Following the massacres, road blocks were put in place to 
prevent victims from fleeing the area, and the UN Special Rapporteur noted during the 
1993 massacres the "phone system had suddenly "broken down' (in the areas involved) . . 
. and had curiously become operational again without any needs for repairs."  
TABLE 1 
Major Reported Human Rights Abuses[59] 
Date  Location  Human Rights Abuse  Note  
1990 
October  
Ugandan 
Border  RPF invades Rwanda  
Government of Rwanda 
stages a mock RPF attack 
on Kigali  
October  Kigali (majority)  
Arbitary arrests and 
detention of citizens; 75% 
were Tutsi. By April 
government acknowledge 
Most released without 
charge by April 1991, but 
abused while in prison  
arrest of over 8,000 people  
October  
Kibilira 
commune, 
perfecture of 
Gisenyi  
Local officials incited Hutu 
attack on Tutsi, over 300 
killed, thousands fled their 
homes and over 500 houses 
burned  
Occured right after the 
invasion, government 
dissmissed and jailed the 
local officials but they were 
soon released  
1991 
January-
February  
Bugogwe and 
NW of 
Rwanda  
Massacre of over 300, 
possibly 1,000 civilians of 
Tutsi subgroup known as 
Bagogwe people, done by 
police, military, civilian 
officials and civilians  
Followed major RPF 
offensive in area, when 
RPF gained town of 
Ruhengeri (one night) and 
released all prisoners  
November  Murambi  
Around 500 primarily Tutsi 
civilians forced to flee, one 
woman killed, girls raped 
and many beaten and injured 
Followed series of savage 
attacks with local officials 
participating, victims 
insulted for being Tutsi  
1992 
August  Kibuye Ara  
"Ethnic" massacres, 85 dead 
and 200 wounded, 500 
houses burned and over 
5,000 people displaced  
Four days after agreement 
on pluralistic transitional 
government between RPF 
and government, arrested 
killers mostly MRND(D) or 
affiliates  
March  Bugesera  Hundred of Tutsis massacred  
Followed incitements from 
an official radio broadcast 
made by Ferdinand 
Nahimana  
End of year  NW communes  
Local government officials, 
on orders from army, 
organized attacks on Tutsis 
called "clear the bush"; 
thousands forced to flee 
homes  
Government identified 
Tutsi as RPF accomplices 
providing "cover" for 
invaders, used this excuse 
to kill approx. 2,000 Tutsi 
from 1990-92  
1993 
January   
International Commission 
on Human Rights allege 
serious and widespread 
abuses  
Visited with ten experts, 
report published in March 
1993  
Date  Location  Human Rights Abuse  Note  
January  NW Rwanda  
Over approx. six days more than 300 
killed and thousands driven from 
International 
Commission warned that 
homes, attacks led by militia of 
MRND and CDR not local officials  
upon it's departure 
government to launch 
new violence, and it did  
late 
January   
Group of Rwanda soldiers called 
amasasu threatened to detect and 
destroy government opponents  
This group stated that 
they felt they were above 
the law  
February   
Rwandan soldier vengance on Tutsi 
civilians and opponents, at least 147 
killed, some soldiers acted alone, 
others with mobs of civilians, military 
also distributed arms to civilians 
supporting government  
February 8: RPF violated 
ceasefire and pushed 
further south  
8-17 
April   
Special Rapporteur on Extra-judicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions 
visits Rwanda  
Report released on 11 
August, 1993 after the 
peace treaty signed  
August  Arusha  President of Rwanda and Chairman ofRPF sign a Peace Agreement   
1994, 6 
April  Kigali  
Pesidents of Burundi and Rwanda 
killed in a plane crash  
Beginning of widespread 
massacres (genocide) 
first in Kigali and later 
across all of Rwanda  
As mentioned, in January 1994, three months before the genocide, the Human Rights 
Watch Arms Project report pointed out many human rights violations. It surmised that, 
since the commencement of hostilities between the FAR and RPF in October 1990, 
approximately 2,000 civilians had been killed at the hands of the militias. The report 
stated that "most of the victims were Tutsi, and they were killed for the sole reason that 
they were Tutsi." Moreover, it warned that the armed bands were well dispersed 
throughout the countryside, and that "they remain in place and ready to move when 
ordered."[60]  
Human Rights Organizations: Did They Do Better? Human rights violations in 
Rwanda were monitored extensively by international human rights organizations from the 
onset of the conflict in 1990. Native Rwandan human rights groups considerably aided 
their international counterparts in investigating and uncovering human rights violations. 
Gerard Prunier states that these organizations were strong "and well organised . . . and 
their militants were taking personal risks in gathering what were soon to become very 
precise and damning reports on the situation in the country."[61] For example, it was at 
the request of Rwandan NGOs that an International Commission of Inquiry, consisting of 
ten human rights experts, visited Rwanda in January 1993, releasing a 100 page report in 
March. Given the extensive coverage by international human rights organizations, it is 
reasonable to ask if these NGO groups provided the international community with 
explicit early warnings of the genocide. If not, could the information they gathered have 
played a role in early warning?  
A summary of the main allegations included in the major reports published by 
international human rights organizations on Rwanda is presented in Table 2. The reports 
provided unequivocal evidence of major and on-going human rights violations, as 
confirmed by successive reports by different groups. The reports pointed to violations by 
all levels of people, from civilians to government officials and by both the RPF and FAR. 
These organizations had long standing involvement in Rwanda even prior to October 
1990. In 1993, the RPF offensive caused "the largest, fastest displacement [of people] the 
humanitarian agencies had ever seen." Janice Stein and Bruce Jones state that these 
NGOs put on hold all of their  
TABLE 2 
Summary list of the types of abuses, violations 
and other indicators reported by human rights groups. 
(1) massacres that were ethnically motivated and arrests far from areas of hostility 
(2) attempts to eliminate political opposition through death threats and assassinations 
(3) military and local involvement in leading and inciting the massacres, plus greater 
security force involvement to repress information after they had occured 
(4) the incitement to violence by the government-run radio, Radio Rwanda and the CDR 
station, Radio Mille Collines 
(5) high-level government involvement in arms distributions and the granting of 
immunity to human rights violators 
(6) high-level government duplicity in it's rhetoric on the suppression of human rights 
abuses 
(7) militias of the MRND and CDR taking a leading role in the violence during 1992, 
heightening political tension 
(8) the existence of Network Zero, death squads, the Interahamwe and Inpuzamugambi, 
including the possibility of involvement by heads of state and the president 
(9) the existence of a second power alongside the government, bent on violence to 
preserve it's dominance and control, and undermine any attempts at peace 
(10) the severe gravity of the situation after the peace agreement and the real possibility 
of a crisis and renewed conflict  
regular programs to rush to the aid of these displaced people and, hence, were no longer 
in a position to report on signals of the impending genocide, which originated in 
Kigali.[62]  
Yet the reports of the international groups fall far short of predicting future atrocities. The 
published reports, upon careful review, do not provide explicit early warning of the 1994 
genocide. None state or surmise that a genocide, or even large massacres, were being 
planned for the future. The closest the reports came to making predictions is the alleged 
existence of sinister groups with nefarious but unconfirmed aims. The UN special 
rapporteur, in August 1993 (before the Arusha Accords were signed), comes the closest 
by calling attention to a "second power that exists alongside that of official authorities." 
He expresses alarm at the widespread proliferation of weapons and notes that "one spark 
is all that is needed to cause the situation to degenerate," but does not point to actual 
plans or machinery to propagate genocide. The Human Rights Watch Arms Project notes 
in January 1994 that "the possibility of renewed fighting is very real," but this refers to 
the FAR/RPF conflict and not to any massive genocide campaign by the Rwandan 
government.  
This analysis confirms that, in general, international human rights organizations, 
including the UN Commission on Human Rights, do not act directly as early warning 
systems. As was the case in Rwanda, they publish reports documenting violations up to 
the time of publication, but rarely try to directly predict future ones. The reports often 
describe the events that have taken place, the locations, the people involved and the 
possible perpetrators of all forms of human rights violations (while seeking to maintain 
the confidentiality of those at risk). Typically, the organizations then make 
recommendations both to bring past violators to trial and to end the continuation of 
abuses. They also actively lobby governments, both foreign and national, to stop the 
violations. Finally, they actively promote, through the media, public awareness of human 
rights violations. But human rights organizations generally do not possess the systematic 
methods for scenario building or threat assessment needed to make predictions of future 
events.  
This does not mean that human rights monitoring is not a valuable source of information 
for early warning or that human rights organizations cannot, in the future, create early 
warning systems themselves. The information and evidence uncovered by human rights 
organizations in Rwanda could easily have helped confirm the existence, activities and 
plans of "Network Zero." NGOs did demonstrate the continuous involvement of 
government elements in past massacres of the Tutsi minority and Hutu moderates. By 
reporting on-going violations throughout the Arusha Peace process, their information 
helped foreign officials gain a better understanding of the instability of the situation and 
the possibility of future obstacles to the peace by both the parties and extremist groups 
operating outside of the peace talks.  
In late 1992, at the insistence of indigenous Rwandan human rights organizations, the 
International Commission of Inquiry was created to investigate human rights abuses in 
Rwanda. Experts from four different International NGOs[63] stated that authorities at the 
highest levels condoned and even consented to the abuses, while the Tutsi victims were 
attacked for the sole reason that they were Tutsis. By the end of 1992, the Commission 
also discovered that the militias of the MRND and CDR had taken a leading role in the 
violence, "privatizing" human rights violations (by moving responsibility away from the 
government) and expanding the scope of the victims to members of the political 
opposition.[64] Furthermore, the Commission uncovered mass grave sites and heard 
testimony to the effect that the president of the republic chaired a "death squad" meeting 
prior to the Bagogwe massacres.[65] The Rwandan government responded to the 
allegations, but human rights groups discovered that following these pledges no action 
was taken by the government to end the abuses.  
By the middle of 1993, human rights reports became more insistent that abuses must be 
stopped. Africa Watch reported the existence of "official lists" of accomplices and the 
distribution of arms to civilians supporting the president.[66] The UN special rapporteur 
for extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions, who visited Rwanda from 7 to 18 
April 1993, provided the most damning report on the Rwandan situation. He supported 
the substance of the report from the International Inquiry, and went on to report on 
massacres, death threats and political assassinations, impunity for the killers, propaganda 
on Radio Rwanda, and the distributions of arms to civilians. Furthermore, he stated that 
FAR were "accused of incitement to murder and of giving logistic support to the 
killers."[67] Most important, he discussed the existence of "death squads" with high level 
government involvement in a clandestine organization known as "Network Zero," a 
"second power" actively attempting to discredit the peace process through the creation of 
"a climate of terror and instability." Finally, he called for the immediate dismantling of 
all violent organizations and the prosecution of all members "whatever their rank," and he 
offered a statement to the effect that the past massacres could be considered genocide due 
to their ethnic motivation. His report came out after the signing of the Arusha Peace 
Accords, and in face of the hopes engendered by the Accords, the report caused little stir, 
as many hopes were pinned on the new peace process. Yet the Human Rights Arms 
Project reported in January 1994 that the "possibility of renewed fighting is very 
real."[68] This report discussed secret documents implicating the government in the 
formation of paramilitary "self defense" groups and even discussed the Interahamwe and 
Inpuzamugambi militias who had taken a lead role in the violence. By March 1994, 
several indigenous human rights activists in Kigali had sent their children out of Kigali 
due to increasing tension. Human Rights Watch later claimed that by this point the 
preparations for the slaughter were well-known to NGOs and diplomats, and that 
"[r]epeated warnings by human rights activists . . . sent a clear signal that a crisis was 
imminent."[69] The organization does not state when or to whom these warnings were 
communicated or their substance.  
PREVENTIVE ACTION  
Peux ce que veux. Allons-y.[70] [Where there's a will there's a way. Let's go.]  
- Major General Romeo Dallaire, Force Commander of UNAMIR, 11 January 1994  
Early warning of the Rwandan genocide was clearly possible for the UN, given the large 
number and types of signals described above. What, then, about prevention of the 
genocide? Senior political leaders in both the UN and governments have already stated 
that the genocide could have been prevented or at least mitigated. But neither the 
politicians nor the practitioners (nor the academics for that matter) have described precise 
measures and detailed scenarios to demonstrate possible means of genocide prevention or 
mitigation.  
Most commentators on the UN's failure in Rwanda merely state that UN troops could and 
should have been deployed to stop the spread of the genocidal fire once it had been 
started on 7 April. This possibility is examined in much detail later in this section. But in 
conflict, as in medicine, prevention is better than cure. Particularly in this brutal and 
senseless slaughter, it would have been much easier to stop the machinery of genocide 
before it had been set into motion. Therefore, it is especially important to look at the early 
preventive measures that could have been taken before the plane crash in which the 
president of Rwanda died, i.e., during the period between January and 6 April 1994. 
These measures may not have guaranteed success, but they may very well have helped 
prevent or mitigate the tragedy. At the very least, they are worth exploring in hindsight.  
Preventive Measures Before 6 April  
While any preventive measures after April 6 would have required the strong application 
of armed force on the part of the UN to stop the spread of genocide, preventive efforts 
prior to 6 April would have involved a creative array of more subtle actions: preventive 
diplomacy, demonstrations of resolve, political lobbying and moderate shows of force. 
The main tool would have been information as opposed to weapons, and the main forum 
would have been the office room and not the battleground. The 2,000 or more UN troops 
present, plus others that could have been added, would provide credibility to the UN 
presence, but the main role for prevention would rest with the SRSG and his political 
affairs officers, UN CIVPOL, (of which there were about 60), human rights observers 
(which were only introduced by UNAMIR later), and a proposed information/intelligence 
unit in the field under the SRSG. The goal would be to cause the genocidists to 
reconsider, delay or even abandon their plans, and to have them removed from power or 
isolated, or in the very least, frustrated in their planning.  
For each effort of the genocidists to prepare for the holocaust, producing early warning 
signals (summarized in Table 3), the UN could possibly have provided a response aimed 
at de-escalation. In response to illicit weapons flowing into Kigali, a more forceful policy 
of insistence on the embargo, monitoring and confiscation might have been applied by 
the peacekeeping forces and governments in accordance with the agreements. Where a 
network of senior Rwandan officials was being trained to carry out genocide, a few 
selected individuals in the chain of command could have been influenced by their foreign 
trainers (e.g., French officers), UN contacts (officials working with the SRSG and the UN 
force), and conscientious colleagues (e.g., like the informer Jean-Pierre) to provide inside 
information and refuse, avoid or minimize their participation in the planning and 
execution of genocide. The loyalties in the Rwandan government were not strong, the 
number of people willing to talk (even confess) was high, and, as discovered by UN and 
aid personnel, the degree of general respect for international personnel was unusually 
high. Diversions of international aid funds, which was suspected in Interahamwe training, 
could have been exposed by international officials, based on the investigations of rumors 
and reports. The genocide leaders could have been identified and isolated or perhaps 
dismissed through the application of political influence on the political system, or more 
specifically on the Rwandan president, who was eager not to displease the international 
community. Additional pressure could have been applied to reduce the level of 
threatening propaganda and, if necessary, to have the extremists' radio station closed 
down. These and other measures, which would have engendered hostile responses, will 
be examined in some more detail.  
Table 3  
The Early Warning Signals Known to the UN  
•  Militia training and complicity in massacres - since 1992 
•  Weapons stockpiling in violation of the peace accords - 
continuous 
•  Political maneuver by extremists to unsettle the peace process - 
1993-94 
•  Public media (RTLM) racist propaganda - 1993-94 
•  Past massacres and assassinations (e.g., human rights reports) - 
January 1993, etc. 
•  Rwandan military officers send Dallaire a note on coming 
massacres - December 1993 
•  Informer ("Jean-Pierre") reports of concrete plans for genocide - 
January 1994  
In broad overview, the UN preventive actions could involve dealing with people (both 
plotters and resisters), the genocide structures (networks) and the tools (i.e., weapons) of 
the genocide. In all three categories, the key would have been a good information-
gathering and analysis system. It was vital to identify who the genocidists were, uncover 
their plans and locate the weapons that were to be used. In the plans for UNAMIR I, 
unfortunately, the UN did not provide for an intelligence capability, though UNAMIR II, 
created after the genocide, possessed considerable intelligence expertise. Even without a 
dedicated intelligence unit in UNAMIR I, more information could have been gathered 
and analyzed by political affairs officers with the SRSG and at headquarters, working 
closely with the Belgian contingent and the UN civilian police.  
To identify the plotters, it would have been necessary to gather more information from 
the informer Jean-Pierre and others. It was a serious mistake for the UN representatives 
to go to the Rwandan president in early January and reveal their information before the 
connection between the president and the plotters was determined. It would have been 
wise to gather more information about the nature of the "extermination" plots and to 
evaluate the degree of support for the plotters. Later, if the UN had come across 
information that the president himself was to be targeted, that information could have 
been extremely useful in convincing the Rwandan head of state to take forceful action 
against the plotters. It is likely that the president would have dismissed key plotters had 
he learned that his own life was at stake.  
As it turns out, General Dallaire appeared to be completely in the dark about the plot and 
plotters on the day of the plane crash. He went to Col. Bagosora, who had effectively 
taken control of the military, to plead for restraint and the immediate installation of the 
moderate prime minister as acting president. Dallaire received a polite, reassuring and 
totally disingenuous reply on the deployment of troops, and a negative response on the 
question of installing the prime minister, who was dismissed as "incompetent." Bagosora 
had already sent soldiers to assassinate the prime minister and Belgian peacekeepers. 
Thus ignorance was very costly to Dallaire and the UN.  
To engage effectively in the subtle art of preventive diplomacy, the UN peacekeepers and 
peacemakers (such as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, or SRSG) 
would have had to identify and understand many characteristics of the plotters: what the 
power base was; who might oppose them; their relationships to the president, the cabinet, 
the army, police, Interahamwe, and the political parties; and their ties to other nations. 
Armed with such information, the SRSG could carefully develop a political strategy, 
beginning with moderate political leaders, to oppose and expose the genocidists. In a 
discreet, intelligent fashion, the SSRG could inform others of the genocidists' actions and 
intentions. At some point, he could even let them know in a subtle fashion that they were 
under suspicion and their activities being questioned. If momentum built, he could insist 
on their dismissal. While such influence may be hard to build, past UN mediators have 
been able to exert considerable authority on conflicting parties, whether it be in the 
Middle East, Asia or Central America.[71]  
It would have been desirable and easy to identify potential resisters of genocidal plots. 
The obvious contacts for any UN intelligence-gathering effort would be human rights 
groups and moderate political leaders, including the prime minister, as well as prominent 
Tutsis. Such links could be forged, not only as a means to get more information, but also 
to apply pressure on and isolate the plotters. Rwandan military officers could have been 
subtly encouraged to share information. Instead, the courageous informer Jean Pierre was 
given the cold shoulder by the UN at an early stage (though fortunately he managed to 
survive).  
The institutions preparing for the genocide, such as the Interahamwe, the Presidential 
Guard, Network Zero, and Radio Mille Collines, could have been brought under pressure, 
especially as evidence of their complicity in genocide plots mounted. These 
organizations, like many in Rwanda, relied on some measure of foreign support. More 
exact accounting for funds and materials could be insisted upon, any diversion of funds 
could be exposed by investigators (using tips, of which there were many), and the 
perpetrators identified and, if possible, punished. The radio station, which was 
broadcasting extremist and incredible messages of hatred, could be brought under 
stronger pressure and closer supervision in the interests of peace and moderation. Had 
repeated UN warnings gone unheeded, the UN peacekeepers could have temporarily 
halted radio broadcasts, jammed them, or even closed down the radio station, as was done 
in Bosnia to the radical Serb radio station.  
Finally, there were the weapons themselves. General Dallaire had prepared plans to raid 
illegal arms caches in and around Kigali, but this was vetoed by UN headquarters. Such 
raids could have been valuable from both the practical and the psychological point of 
view. Col. Marchand provides this useful insight:  
Jean-Pierre located various arms caches throughout Kigali. A UN officer accompanied 
him to MRND headquarters. In the basement there was indeed a stockpile of arms and 
ammunition, so we immediately sent a request to the NY office to carry out search 
operations. The response was negative. We weren't able to proceed with this type of 
operation because NY said this wasn't UNAMIR's mandate. Consequently, we weren't 
allowed to touch the arms caches, and UNAMIR lost a great deal of credibility in the 
field. Around the time people began to make fun of UNAMIR. They distorted its French 
acronym "MINUAR" to "MINUA," which as far as I know means "moving the mouth" in 
the Kinyarwanda language, which meant that UNAMIR talked big, but didn't act.[72]  
Because UNAMIR did not take action on the known weapons caches, which were blatant 
violations of the Arusha Accords and its terms of reference, UNAMIR lost a large 
measure of support and the confidence of the population. At the very least, had the issue 
of weapons locations been pursued, UNAMIR would have been in a better position to 
make access to them more difficult once the genocide began.  
In general, had the UN applied a number of the above measures to bring fear into the 
minds of the genocide plotters, the fate of the Rwandan people might have been very 
different. If these measures were not effective, then the UN would, at least, have been 
more experienced and knowledgeable about the plotters and their means, so that when the 
genocide did begin in earnest on 7 April, the UN would have been better prepared to 
recognize it and counteract it with force.  
Preventive Measures After 6 April  
The quick involvement of 400 excellent paratroopers may have saved the situation.  
- Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, November 1994[73]  
It is widely accepted that the United Nations could have taken steps soon after the 
genocide began to prevent much of the senseless mass killing that followed. But, again, 
high-ranking officials of both the UN and member-states, particularly the United States, 
failed to recognize and publicly declare the genocide even as tens of thousands were 
being slaughtered. Early recognition would have focused more international attention on 
the horrors in Rwanda, increased pressure by NGOs and an outraged public to stop the 
killings immediately, and caused the Security Council to strengthen UNAMIR at an early 
stage. Instead, the systematic killing of Tutsis was inaccurately described as "ethnic 
violence," the inevitable consequence of the civil war between the RPF and the FAR. On 
21 April, two weeks into the genocide, the Security Council, in UN Resolution 912, 
altered the mandate of UNAMIR not to stop the genocide, but to "act as an intermediary 
between the parties in an attempt to secure their agreement to a cease-fire." The genocide 
in Rwanda was portrayed by the UN as random outbreaks of violence between Hutus and 
Tutsis, when in fact the violence was centrally orchestrated, and directed by the 
extremists primarily against Tutsis.  
As the harsh facts about the Rwandan situation reached the desks in foreign ministries 
and UN Headquarters, high-ranking officials were still hesitant to apply the term 
"genocide" to the catastrophe. A public acknowledgment of genocide would have 
compelled member-states to actively intervene under the Genocide Convention. As a 
result, policy makers scrambled to simultaneously handle the situation and avoid using 
the term "genocide," which would have required immediate intervention. When pressed 
before the media, embarrassed spokespersons struggled with their terminology. As late as 
mid-June, American State Department spokeswoman Christine Shelly still denied that a 
full-blown genocide was taking place, maintaining that "although there have been acts of 
genocide in Rwanda, all the murders cannot be put into that category."[74]  
Likewise, the UN Security Council publicly sidestepped an acknowledgment of genocide. 
In a statement issued on 30 April, the Security Council president started moving in that 
direction when he declared that "killing members of an ethnic group with the intention of 
destroying such a group in whole or in part constitutes a crime punishable under 
international law." Still, the president refused to apply the term "genocide" to Rwanda, 
only going so far as to condemn the "massacres and wanton killing."[75]  
As the terminology charade continued, so did the genocide. Not until the last week of 
May did UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali concede publicly that genocide 
had been committed.[76] By that time, hundreds of thousands of Tutsis had been 
slaughtered.  
If, in the first few weeks of April, UN officials in New York had publicly announced that 
a systematic plan to wipe out a section of Africans had commenced in Rwanda, it is 
reasonable to believe that an international consensus would have demanded a swift, 
aggressive reaction against the genocidists, perhaps facilitating the implementation of 
Dallaire's later proposal for intervention. This expression of will could have limited the 
extent of the killings, if not squashed the genocide as a whole. It could have, as the UN 
Lessons Learned Unit wrote in December 1996, "sent a message of international resolve 
to those who were organizing the killings."[77]  
From a better awareness of the Rwandan genocide, concrete actions could have been 
taken. Though specific scenarios have scarcely been examined, evidence does suggest 
that quick, offensive action during the first crucial weeks of April by an intervening force 
could have saved thousands of lives. To do so, such a force would need the proper 
mandate and political backing, sufficient manpower and resources (equipment and 
logistical support), expert training and a clearly-defined mission.  
General Dallaire has argued that the UN force, with the proper personnel and political 
will, could have prevented the genocide in its first weeks. He had even developed a 
proposal in May 1994 while still in the field, which he described in a report of the 
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict in January 1997. An intervention 
force of 5,000, deployed between 7 April and 21 April 1994, would, he argued, have been 
sufficient to halt the slaughter.[78] Dallaire's plan called for a new Security Council 
mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which would have permitted UN soldiers 
to use force to reestablish peace and security.[79] Such a force would have possessed a 
mandate to "stop the genocide," as well as to "conduct peace enforcement," "assist in the 
return of refugee and displaced persons," "ensure the successful delivery of humanitarian 
aid," and to "assist in a cessation of hostilities." Dallaire envisioned this force to be more 
assertive than UNAMIR. It would have used "offensive action, including the use of 
deadly force, to prevent continued genocidal killing." In addition, he emphasized the 
importance of gathering information on the perpetrators of the genocide for later use in 
criminal tribunals.[80]  
Dallaire divided the mission of his envisioned force into several phases. It began with 
ensuring the security of the Kigali sector, and the shutting down of extremist radio 
transmissions. It is suggested that he add the establishment of a UN radio station (as used 
effectively in Cambodia) and by UNAMIR II (the successor operation in Rwanda formed 
in the light of the genocide) to mount a counter-propaganda campaign to convince 
Rwandans not to follow the irrational orders to commit genocide. Then, Dallaire 
envisioned that battalions would move outward to secure provinces in the northwest and 
southwest. In the process, "safe sites, smaller and more easily defended community 
groupings" would be created to protect civilian victims. Finally, once the genocide had 
been halted, the force would push back both the RPF and FAR as far as possible to their 
positions antebellum. It would then scale back both its mandate and personnel size and 
begin to implement a ceasefire.[81]  
Some have argued that an even smaller force could have intervened to prevent genocide. 
The UN Secretary-General at the time, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, affirmed his belief in 
November 1994 that as few as 400 troops could have "saved the situation." Boutros-Ghali 
emphasized the "quick involvement" of those troops as a precondition for their 
success.[82] The Secretary-General's remark suggests that the killers in Rwanda were so 
lightly armed and poorly trained that even the most skeletal of intervening forces, with an 
offensive mandate, could have easily overwhelmed them.  
However, the encouraging forecasts about the use of force after 6 April must be tempered 
by the obstacles such a mission would have encountered. First, while the Carnegie report 
does mention the reluctance of countries like the United States to provide support for this 
kind of offensive force after the Somalia fiasco,[83] it neglects to project casualty levels 
and their political impact on involved countries. One must remember the Belgian reaction 
to the deaths of ten of its soldiers. It is impossible to believe that an intervening force, 
other than a massive one, could have secured the deadly, chaotic Kigali sector without at 
least a few soldiers killed, regardless of an edge in firepower. It is doubtful whether 
nations providing troops would be willing to tolerate significant losses in their own 
troops, though in Bosnia some such commitment was shown (where over 250 UN 
peacekeepers perished over four years). In any case, one can be certain that a great many 
Rwandan lives could have been saved, in addition to the 20,000 or so that UNAMIR 
protected with its meager resources of only 450 troops.  
Second, an intervening force with a more aggressive mandate like the one proposed by 
Dallaire would undoubtedly be forced to inflict casualties in order to stop the genocide. 
Mistakes could be made; innocent civilians could be killed. With major loss of life, the 
United Nations could be accused by the international community of committing 
aggression, not promoting security. This is hardly the image of a United Nations 
dedicated to promoting international peace. Still, if the losses were accidental and 
minimal compared to the genocide, the UN could sustain its operations despite criticisms.  
Third, one must consider the political repercussions in Rwanda. No doubt, the genocidists 
who held power would have opposed a more active UN presence that was designed to 
foil their plans. They would not have given consent to an offensive-minded peacekeeping 
force on Rwandan soil. This anticipated opposition raises questions about the UN's legal 
authority and legitimacy in conflicts in which the consent of one or more parties is 
missing. It would have required the invocation of Chapter VII, which permits the UN to 
use force against the will of a party, even of a member state. This has been done at least a 
dozen times since the end of the Cold War and so it is feasible, if the political will exists.  
Thus, in spite of the difficulties inherent in foiling a premeditated, systematic plan for 
genocide, the potential for large numbers of casualties, and the likely negative reaction of 
the party involved in the killings, a preventive deployment force with some offensive 
(Chapter VII) capability can, with hindsight, be advocated. Quick, decisive action by the 
UN might have isolated the genocide to the Kigali sector before it spread into the 
countryside. This could have made it easier to establish safe zones in the countryside for 
fleeing refugees to enter under protection of the United Nations. Yet the United Nations 
failed to provide timely intervention. What was provided, rather, was a unilateral French 
force, under Operation Turquoise, which, while considered successful in saving lives, did 
too little, too late, and too selectively.  
On 22 June 1994, the Security Council authorized the French government to conduct 
Operation Turquoise, a unilateral military operation under Chapter VII whose stated 
purpose was to protect refugees in some areas and secure humanitarian aid. With a force 
of 2,500 soldiers, complete with armored carriers, helicopters and fighter planes, this 
seemed to be the type of offensive force envisioned by Dallaire. Turquoise did prevent 
the loss of lives, mostly of Hutus fleeing the RPF (including many of the genocide 
planners and perpetrators). But while the force did have armored cars at its disposal, it 
lacked trucks necessary to transport fleeing victims to safety. As a result, many Tutsis 
who were distant from the "safe humanitarian zone," which was set up by France at the 
beginning of July, continued to be slaughtered by genocidists.[84] Turquoise was a 
qualified success in that it helped curb the flow of refugees to Zaire and other 
neighboring states. It also created a safe, humanitarian zone in the southwest corner of the 
country. Yet it failed to prevent the killings of Tutsis and extremist propaganda in other 
areas of the country. Turquoise was not the right kind of intervening force, for it did not 
have the mandate to actively stop the genocide. It began too late, essentially after the 
Tutsi genocide was over. It aided principally those who perpetrated the genocide.[85]  
Another option was available to UN officials after 6 April. The Security Council could 
have authorized a mission to establish small safe havens in strategic locations in Kigali 
and the Rwandan countryside. Such a mission, if deployed in a timely fashion, would 
have limited the scope of the killings, though not prevented them. In fact, the UN 
supervised three protected areas in Kigali at the Milles Collines Hotel, the King Faisal 
Hospital, and the city's main Stadium. Some 15,000 refugees (mostly Tutsis) were 
protected at the hospital, thanks to the efforts of the Bangladeshi and later Ghanian 
soldiers who guarded it. In the first two weeks of the genocide alone, UNAMIR was able 
to remove from immediate danger over 4,000 persons, including groups of orphans. The 
Humanitarian Assistance Cell of UNAMIR helped coordinate transport for evacuees and 
escorts for NGO/Red Cross convoys. In May and June, when operations were 
intentionally inhibited by the militias and Rwandese Government Forces (RGF), 
UNAMIR provided safe passage for another 4,000 displaced persons. In July, when 
Hutus forces had retreated mostly to the southern and eastern frontier, UNAMIR 
provided safe passage to Kigali for some 6,500 people (mostly Tutsis). UNAMIR also 
helped conduct regular POW and refugee exchanges between the RPF and the RGF 
during and after the fighting.[86] Fortunately, Dallaire never reached the low level of 270 
troops that headquarters had determined to be sufficient (on decision of the Security 
Council). Some 450 troops were able to man these posts, as well as the airport, 
throughout the worst phase of the genocide.  
With increased resources and pursuing a policy of containment, new safe areas could 
have been stationed in places where genocide had not yet spread. Rather than actively 
confront the genocidists through force, peacekeepers in this kind of operation would have 
focused on setting up areas to which victims could flee, and digging in fortifications from 
which to protect them. This limited, defensive option clearly poses less risk to 
peacekeepers. In contrast to the safe areas and protected areas set up in Bosnia, some of 
which ultimately failed dismally to secure the lives of victims, the Rwandan safe areas 
would have been much easier to defend. The perpetrators of the genocide were poorly 
armed (mostly with machetes), less organized and less professional than the Serb forces. 
Yet by itself, the safe haven concept could not be expected to prevent entirely the 
genocide. It would not have stopped the Interahamwe from house-to-house killing sprees 
in Kigali and villages around the country that were not UN protected; it would not have 
removed weapons from the hands of the genocidists. Without a stronger mandate, 
peacekeepers would be forced to stand guard over their protective areas and watch while 
unlucky civilians were being slaughtered in the hills not far away, or on their way to the 
safe areas. In short, safe-havens alone could not have stopped senseless killing in 
Rwanda. A more aggressive UN force immediately deployed after 6 April, having created 
carefully selected safe zones, could have started sending armed units (with armored 
personnel carriers) to halt the killings elsewhere. This may very well have stopped or 
slowed the genocide before it reached its peak frenzy across the traumatized nation.  
POLITICAL WILL  
What is involved here is, as I have said, a bitter failure, not only for the United Nations, 
but for the international community as a whole. We are all responsible for this failure, 
whoever we may be - international organizations, the great Powers and non-
governmental organizations, as well as the African countries themselves.  
- Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 13 June 1994.[87]  
From the previous sections, it should be clear that the UN could have developed a better 
information system and could have taken a range of preventive measures to forestall or at 
least mitigate an anticipated genocide. What, then, prevented the UN from doing so? The 
simple answer is a lack of political will.[88] In the words of the current Secretary-
General, Kofi Annan, the Rwandan experience highlighted "the crucial importance of 
swift intervention in a conflict and, above all, of political will to act in the face of a 
catastrophe."[89]  
The lack of willingness at the time to consider swift and bold measures was shared by 
almost all the players at the UN, including Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (and 
presumably his Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Kofi Annan), and the 
political leaders in the capitals of major member states. The main reason for this broad 
lack of resolve was that the leading and dominant member of the UN, the United States, 
was viewing UN peacekeeping cautiously, in an introverted manner, and with fear of 
over-involvement. Without US leadership and support, other states were hesitant to 
commit themselves politically or militarily. And no nation was willing to step forward to 
take the place of the United States, even on high moral grounds or in such an extreme 
emergency. To make matters worse, some states, like Belgium, lobbied for a cowardly 
withdrawal of the entire peacekeeping mission, even as the mission was providing 
protection to thousands of Rwandans. The Council acted in this fatalistic spirit by 
ordering a force reduction to 250 shortly after the genocide had begun.  
The lack of US commitment was the result of several factors. First, in Somalia the 
previous year the United States had to withdraw from a disastrous mission after over one 
score of US soldiers had been killed and the UN/US objective of apprehending one of the 
clan leaders (Mohammed Aideed) had failed. As a result of that experience, Washington 
officials were developing a new, less friendly approach to UN peacekeeping. This was 
enunciated in Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, which was finalized in April 
1994, at the worst possible time for any progressive peackeeping actions in Rwanda. The 
directive, which President Clinton signed on 3 May 1994 while the Rwandan genocide 
was in full swing, proposed "increasingly rigorous standards of review for US support 
and participation" in UN peacekeeping.[90] Support was normally to be provided only to 
those UN missions with clear time-bound objectives which "advance US interests," 
where the means are available and little risk need be taken by the United States. To make 
matters worse, the doctrine of only using "overwhelming force" was popular in US 
government circles at the time. But moving large US forces to a remote, land-locked 
African country was far beyond what the United States was willing to do for strictly 
humanitarian reasons. As stated in PDD 25, the United States cannot be the "world's 
policeman."  
France, another permanent member of the Security Council, was not politically disposed 
to prevent this genocide. It had long-standing links to the genocidal Hutu regime, links 
that existed on a personal as well as institutional level. France had turned a blind eye to 
many government atrocities committed in the past. It had even helped provide abundant 
arms to the future genocidaires. Only after the genocide had run almost its full course, 
and the Hutu regime had fallen, did France intervene with troops, mostly to protect and 
assist the fleeing Hutus. This was not necessarily a wrong act, but it shows that the 
willingness to act was based strongly on favoritism. The United Kingdom, another 
European member of the Security Council, was not inclined, as it seldom is, to take the 
lead or a contrary position on matters in Francophone Africa. Furthermore, neither Russia 
nor China assume leadership roles in human rights, having their own share of internal 
abuses and external accusations to defend.  
In the UN Secretariat, officials were cautious to move, knowing that Security Council 
members, to whom they felt ultimately responsible, were not in the mood to adopt bold 
measures. Kofi Annan writes: "the consequences of the retreat from Somalia and the 
reluctance to again commit international resources and political capital soon became 
evident as the international community agonized over how to respond to the tragedy that 
began to unfold in Rwanda."[91]  
What, then, is necessary for political will to be developed to prevent future atrocities like 
Rwanda? Primarily it is a matter of fostering a sense of enlightened self-interest among 
all nations, especially the major powers, linking human welfare around the globe with 
one's own. It means recognizing that human security is indivisible. When crimes against 
one section of humanity are committed, no matter where, it is a crime against all of 
humanity. This kind of moral imperative to help alleviate human tragedy and maintain 
peace should bind the world to action against genocide no matter where it is committed 
or by whom. This imperative was recognized in the post-Rwanda rhetoric of President 
Clinton: "[l]et us challenge ourselves to build a world in which no branch of humanity . . 
. is again threatened with destruction. . . . Let us work together as a community of 
civilized nations to strengthen our ability to prevent, and, if necessary, to stop 
genocide."[92]  
If enlightened self-interest is not enough to spur leaders to take risks on behalf of peace, 
then the fear of inaction should also be a motivating force. If they fail to take preventive 
action, leading nations should be held to task. Both within states and across states, there 
needs to be a growing movement of peoples and organizations to promote national and 
international commitment to the prevention of crimes against humanity. These 
constituencies of concerned citizens should be strong enough that leaders of major 
powers feel obliged to meet the higher standards that these people set.  
A further motivating force can be the force of international law. The imperative to action 
need not simply be moral, it can also be legal. It has been already stated that under the 
Genocide Convention, nations are obliged to prevent this horrendous crime against 
humanity. Beyond this general directive, however, the Convention's proposal for action is 
weak and vague: it only mentions that states "may call upon the competent organs of the 
United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they 
consider appropriate" (Article VIII). The Convention, which was negotiated at the 
beginning of the Cold War, can and should be strengthened considerably. Mechanisms 
for early warning, preventive action, military intervention and criminal prosecution can 
be elaborated by the Security Council and in future human rights treaties. In so doing, the 
international community would help raise the legal standard for action, which is 
inextricably linked with the moral responsibility for action. By holding leaders 
responsible to higher legal as well as moral standards, the degree of political will can be 
increased.  
CONCLUSION The Rwandan genocide definitely could have been foreseen and possibly 
could have been prevented. At the very least, it could have been greatly mitigated by the 
UN. This conclusion takes into account the information and resources which were 
available to the UN, its mandate and its potential and previously demonstrated ability to 
adapt to difficult conflict situations. The UN peacekeeping mission could undoubtedly 
have expanded its activities and efforts (diplomatic, humanitarian and military) at an 
early stage, given the clear warnings available to it. What was absent was the political 
will, in the Secretariat and in the Security Council, to make bold decisions and to develop 
the means to create new information and prevention measures. The lesson of Rwanda is 
clear: we must build the international political will, as well as an enhanced UN capability, 
for prevention. The UN should develop its ability for gathering and analyzing 
information, for making early warnings,[93] and for rapid reaction though deployment of 
peacekeeping troops, as well as diplomatic creative initiatives. The world community 
owes it to the hundreds of thousands of innocent human beings who were slaughtered 
during the Rwandan genocide to try to predict and prevent future genocides. The 
redemption of the UN from its failures in Rwanda can occur only when the organization 
and its member states strive anew to achieve the goals set out in the opening words of the 
UN Charter: "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war . . . to reaffirm faith 
in fundamental human rights . . . to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the 
institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest."  
APPENDIX  
The "Genocide Fax": Cable From UNAMIR Force Commander Major General Romeo 
Dallaire to UN Headquarters.  
DATE: 11 JANUARY 1994  
TO: BARIL\DPKO\UNATIONS\NEW YORK  
FROM: DALLAIRE\UNAMIR\KIGALI  
FAX NO: MOST IMMEDIATE-CODE CABLE  
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR PROTECTION FOR INFORMANT  
ATTN: MGEN BARIL ROOM NO. 2052  
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE: 2  
1. Force commander put in contact with informant by very very important government 
politician. Informant is a top level trainer in the cadre of Interahamwe-armed militia of 
MRND.  
2. He informed us he was in charge of last Saturdays demonstrations which aims were to 
target deputies of opposition parties coming to ceremonies and Belgian soldiers. They 
hoped to provoke the RPF BN to engage (being fired upon) the demonstrators and 
provoke a civil war. Deputies were to be assassinated upon entry or exit from parliament. 
Belgian troops were to be provoked and if Belgian soldiers resorted to force a number of 
them were to be killed and thus guarantee Belgian withdrawal from Rwanda.  
3. Informant confirmed 48 RGF Para Cdo and a few members of the gendarmerie 
participated in demonstrations in plain clothes. Also at least one minister of the MRND 
and the Sous-Prefect of Kigali were in the demonstration. RGF and Interahamwe 
provided radio communications.  
4. Informant is a former security member of the President. He also stated he is paid 
RF150,000 per month by MRND party to train Interahamwe. Direct link is to chief of 
staff RGF and President of the MRND for financial and material support.  
5. Interahamwe has trained 1700 men in RGF military corps outside the capital. The 1700 
are scattered in groups of 40 throughout Kigali. Since UNAMIR deployed he has trained 
300 personnel in 3 week sessions at RGF camps. Training focus was discipline, weapons, 
explosives, close combat and tactics.  
6. Principal aim of Interahamwe in the past was to protect Kigali from RPF. Since 
UNAMIR mandate he has been ordered to register all Tutsis in Kigali. He suspects it is 
for their extermination. Example he gave was that in 20 minutes his personnel could kill 
up to 1,000 Tutsis.  
7. Informant states that he disagrees with anti-Tutsi extermination. He supports 
opposition to RPF but cannot support killing of innocent persons. He also states that he 
believes the President does not have full control over all elements of his own 
party/faction.  
8. Informant is prepared to provide location of major weapons cache with at least 135 
weapons. He already has distributed 110 weapons including 35 with ammunition and can 
give us details of their location. Type of weapons are G3 and AK47 provided by RGF. He 
was ready to go to the arms cache tonight-if we gave him the following guarantee. He 
requests that he and his family (his wife and four children) be placed under our 
protection.  
9. It is our intention to take action within the next 36 hours with a possible H hour of 
Wednesday at dawn (local). Informant states that hostilities may commence again if 
political deadlock ends. Violence could take place day of the ceremonies or the day after. 
Therefore Wednesday will give greatest chance of success and also be most timely to 
provide significant input to on-going political negotiations.  
10. It is recommended the informant be granted protection and evacuated out of Rwanda. 
This HQ does not have previous UN experience in such matters and urgently requests 
guidance. No contact has yet been made to any embassy in order to inquire if they are 
prepared to protect him for a period of time by granting diplomatic immunity in their 
embassy in Kigali before moving him and his family out of the country.  
11. FC will be meeting with the very very important political person tomorrow morning 
in order to ensure that this individual is conscious of all parameters of his involvement. 
FC does have certain reservations on the suddenness of the change of heart of the 
informant to come clean with this information. Recce of armed cache and detailed 
planning of raid to go on late tomorrow. Possibility of a trap not fully excluded, as this 
may be a set-up against the very very important political person. FC to inform SRSG first 
thing in morning to ensure his support.  
12. Peux ce que veux. Allons-y.  
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